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PUBLIC LAW
CRIMINAL LAW
Dale E. Bennett*
The attempt article of the Louisiana Criminal Code punishes
an attempt to commit any crime, and the maximum penalty is
generally set at one half of the penalty provided for the offense
attempted.1 A special problem was presented by the crime of
theft, which is graded according to the amount stolen.2 In at-
tempted theft it is often impossible to fix, with any degree of
accuracy, the amount the defendant planned to steal. Thus a
special penalty, with a maximum fine of two hundred dollars
and a maximum prison term of one year, was provided for at-
tempted theft.3
State v. Ganey4 presented a difficult problem as to the scope
and applicability of the special theft penalty clause of the at-
tempt article. Ganey appealed from a sentence of five years
for attempted theft of a cow. The special cattle theft law, upon
which the conviction was based, defines the crime of theft of
cattle and other livestock, with a maximum penalty of ten years
imprisonment, regardless of the value of the animal stolen.5 In
upholding the five-year sentence, the majority of the court rea-
soned that the crime of theft of cattle was separate and distinct
from the general theft crime; and thus concluded that the sen-
tence for attempted theft of cattle was governed by the general
attempt penalty clause, 6 rather than by the provision for at-
tempts coming under the general theft article.' Following this
reasoning, the five-year sentence, which was one half of the
maximum sentence for cattle theft, was proper.
Justice McCaleb's dissenting opinion took the position that
the special theft penalty clause should apply to all attempted
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 14:27 (1950).
2. Id. 14:67.
3. Id. 14:27(2).
4. 246 La. 986, 169 So. 2d 73 (1964).
5. LA. R.S. 14:67.1 (1950).
6. Id. 14:27 (3).
7. Id. 14:27(2).
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thefts, whether under the general theft article or a special cattle
theft statute.8
This writer sees no substantial justification for providing a
penalty of from one to ten years for stealing a cow, hog, or goat,
regardless of the value of the animal stolen. It would appear that
the general theft article9 with the penalty graded according to
the value of the thing stolen, is adequate to take care of all such
cases. However, since cattle theft is designated as a separate
crime, it would seem that the Supreme Court was justified in
holding the general penalty clause applicable. This is in keeping
with the purpose of the special theft clause, which was aimed at
eliminating the difficulty of determining how much the defend-
ant was attempting to steal, i.e., the grade of the theft attempted.
SIMPLE KIDNAPPING
Simple kidnapping is a very broad offense, covering a num-
ber of situations where the taking or enticing away of another
person is criminal. 10 State v. Bertrand" involved an interpreta-
tion of the scope and interrelation of the first two clauses of
the simple kidnapping article of the Criminal Code. Clause (1)
covers "the intentional and forcible seizing and carrying of any
person from one place to another without his consent." (Em-
phasis added.) It is the essence of simple kidnapping under this
clause that the carrying of the victim must be forcible and with-
out his consent. Clause (2) covers "the intentional taking, en-
ticing or decoying away, for an unlawful purpose, of any child
not his own and under the age of fourteen years, without the
consent of its parents or the person charged with its custody."
(Emphasis added.) Clause (2) is satisfied by enticing the vic-
tim away, but requires that the enticing away must have been
for "an unlawful purpose" and that the victim must be a child
"under the age of fourteen years." Bertrand was convicted of
simple kidnapping of a six-year-old girl, and the indictment con-
tained allegations based upon requirements stated in both clauses
8. Justice McCaleb states, 246 La. 986, 998, 169 So. 2d 73, 77 (1964) : "This
is not a judicial function and, until the Legislature itself changes the penalty pro-
vided for attempted theft by R.S. 14 :27, it should be applied as written irrespec-
tive of whether the substantive crime is denounced by a special statute dealing
with thefts of particular things or chattels or by the general statute relating to all
thefts."
9. LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950).
10. Id. 14:45, as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 344.
11. 247 La. 232, 170 So. 2d 386 (1964).
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(1) and (2) of the simple kidnapping article.1 2 A motion in
arrest of judgment was largely predicated upon the contention
that the indictment had failed to specify the unlawful purpose
for which the child was taken, thus omitting "an essential ele-
ment of the offense."
If the indictment was to be judged by the requirements of
clause (2) of the simple kidnapping statute, it would have been
insufficient. As the dissenting opinion pointed out, "an indict-
ment . . . does not satisfy constitutional or statutory require-
ments by simply charging in the language of the statute that
the accused carried away the child for an unlawful purpose,
as the phrase 'for an unlawful purpose' is a general and in-
definite term which does not inform the accused of the specific
facts on which the charge is based.' 3
The majority opinion upheld the indictment, however, upon
the basis of clause (1) of the simple kidnapping article. It is
significant to note that clause (1) covers "the intentional and
forcible seizing and carrying of any person," and would apply
to kidnapping of either adults or children. Justice Sanders, who
wrote the majority opinion, stated, "An examination of the
language of the indictment discloses that it charges that the
defendant intentionally and forcibly seized and carried the child
from her home. . . . Under the statute, the distance traversed
is immaterial. Nor is it necessary to specify the place to which
the child was carried. ' 14 If the defense needs that information,
it may be procured by a bill of particulars. When the prosecu-
tion is based upon clause (1), it is not necessary to allege or
prove an unlawful purpose. The essential elements are that
the seizing and carrying were "forcible" and "without his con-
sent." In the case of a six-year old child this second element
was satisfied by charging that the forcible taking away was
"without the consent of her parents."
Dissenting Judge McCaleb maintained that clause (1) re-
12. The indictment charged that Bertrand "did unlawfully and intentionally
commit simple kidnapping by unlawfully, criminally and intentionally, with force,
and arms, and for an unlawful purpose, seize one Cheryl Lynn Ortego, a female
person not his own and being six years of age, at her home located at Route 1
Box 274, Elton, Louisiana, a place within Jefferson Davis Parish, State of
Louisiana, and did forcibly carry and take away the said Cheryl Lynn Ortego,
from her home, without the consent of her parents who were charged with custody
of said Cheryl Lynn Ortego." Id. at 235, 170 So. 2d at 388.
13. Id. at 246, 170 So. 2d at 391, citing cases.
14. Id. at 237, 170 So. 2d at 388.
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ferred only to cases involving the kidnapping of persons fourteen
years of age or over; while clause (2) covered the kidnapping
of children under the age of fourteen, where it is the lack of the
parents' consent that is material. It is impossible, on a close
point of construction like this, to say that either view is wrong;
for there is a logical basis for either analysis. However, it is
submitted that the majority opinion, in holding that clause (1)
applies to all forcible seizing and carrying, regardless of the age
of the victim, provides a practical determination of the probable
legislative intent.
CRIMINAL TRESPASS - SPECIAL STATUTES
Criminal trespass is an offense which, by its very nature, is
not susceptible of general definition. The needs of a farming
community are quite different from those of a swamp or timber
area. These variant considerations are evidenced in the 1960
and 1964 amendments of the criminal trespass article of the
Criminal Code,15 which provided a separate rule for certain spe-
cified parishes and authorized the governing authorities of those
parishes to adopt additional regulations, not inconsistent with
the general provisions of the law. In addition, the 1962 legisla-
ture adopted a special criminal trespass law for Jefferson Davis
Parish,"! and a 1964 statute provided a special criminal trespass
law for Bossier Parish.1 7 The Jefferson Davis statute was de-
clared unconstitutional by the City Court of Jennings, which
held that, since it applied only to one parish, it was "arbitrary,
capricious and discriminatory." In reversing the city court's
judgment and upholding the special Jefferson Davis Criminal
trespass statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: "The
equal protection clause relates to equality between persons as
such, rather than between areas. Clearly, the guaranty of equal
protection is not a demand that all state laws operate from
boundary to boundary. It compels no state to adopt an iron rule
of territorial uniformity for legislation. In the enactment of
laws, the Legislature may consider the 'needs and desires' of the
various sections of the state without infringing equal protec-
tion."18
15. LA. R.S. 14:63 (Supp. 1964).
16. Id. 14:63.5.
17. id. 14:63.6.
18. 247 La. 631, 636, 173 So. 2d 192, 194 (1965), citing United States Su-
preme Court decisions in point.
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It is well settled that the "equal protection" clause of the
United States Constitution only relates to equality between per-
sons. "In the absence of restrictions contained in state con-
stitutions, the legislature may determine within broad limits
whether particular laws shall extend to the whole state or be
limited in their operation to particular portions of the state. All
that the Federal Constitution requires is that they shall be
general in their application within the territory in which they
operate."' 19 A relevant limitation in the Louisiana Constitution
prohibits local or special laws "concerning any civil or criminal
actions. '20 This provision has been construed as meaning "merely
that the Legislature shall not pass a local or special law affecting
any particular lawsuit or regulating the trial of lawsuits, civil
or criminal, in any particular locality."'21
Turning more specifically to the problem at hand, Justice
Sanders added: "The rich diversities in the land, people, and
culture of Louisiana are matters of common knowledge. They
have been celebrated in song and story. Many of these are deeply
rooted in history. The rural-urban diversity is but one of sev-
eral that affect trespass laws. The variegated patterns of
topography and land-use militate against state-wide uniformity
in trespass legislation. '22 In further support of the decision,
upholding the statute, the court stressed the fact that there had
been "no showing that the relevant conditions and needs in Jef-
ferson Davis Parish are the same as those of other parishes,"
and stated, "The Court cannot assume the absence of differences
when there is no proof."
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
Hector Currie*
The past term produced, as usual, instances of lenders who
asserted that their claims were not affected by a debtor's dis-
charge in bankruptcy, by reason of section 17a(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act which provides in part:
19. 16 Am. JUR.2d 894.
20. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
21. State v. McCue, 141 La. 417, 421, 75 So. 100, 101 (1917).
22. 247 La. 631, 637, 173 So. 2d 192, 195 (1965).
23. Ibid.
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